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1. Abstract
This report addresses the climate policy gap in Wales. It draws from the author’s 
expertise and decade-long interdisciplinary research on energy and climate policy, 
energy transitions and ecological economics, as well as from his participation in the 
multi-million, EU-funded WiseGRID project on smart grids. The report is also based 
on a thorough scrutiny of the Welsh political and climate policy context and existing 
legislative framework, the work of the National Assembly for Wales Climate Change, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Committee, the Welsh Government’s related policy 
documents, including the most recent Prosperity for All: A low carbon Wales, and 
the UK Committee on Climate Change advice and reports, including the very recent 
report Net Zero: The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming. The report 
contributes insights and conceptualisations of the climate change challenge and its 
interaction with other key political and policy priorities, and sources evidence and 
best practices from around the world.
After mapping the current policy framework, the report argues for bolder climate 
targets in line with climate science and proportionate carbon budgets to the effect of 
carbon neutrality before 2050. This advice is premised upon the strong legal grounds 
of the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, compelling economic 
arguments regarding the costs of climate inaction and the merits of front-loaded 
action, and developing political grounds emanating from civil society pressure and 
the need for a more pivotal role for the state. 
The report elaborates on the co-benefits of an ambitious climate policy, and provides 
ample evidence and global best practices that can be utilised in Wales. It also 
discusses Welsh climate policy within the broader growth paradigm Wales follows, 
and sets out different energy transition pathways. 
The report also recalibrates current policy schemes and proposals on the table. More 
specifically, it qualifies the need for an energy company for Wales, and delineates the 
role and the tasks it could play, and looks into the potential for rendering the Zone 
Demarcation Scheme more engaging with local communities/ citizens. Caught within 
the current Brexit conundrum, the report also points at a number of implications 
Brexit can bear for Welsh climate policy. 
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  The energy transition must increase, rather than undermine, equality. This calls 
for a differentiated set of measures that include: the prioritisation of ending 
energy poverty through binary climate-social policy schemes; proportional 
support to the most affluent to immerse into clean energy schemes; and, 
nudging the business sector to contribute its fair share in the climate struggle by 
increasing corporate sourcing of clean energy.
Recalibrating current schemes/ proposals on the table
  Climate policy can be bundled with other public policy issues to yield positive 
outcomes on multiple fronts. Substantial co-benefits can be reaped by an 
ambitious climate agenda in particular in regards to economic development, 
health,  social policy and energy security. 
  An energy company for Wales is essential in this juncture. While rightly 
rejected as a green energy producer and provider, there is ample space for 
the establishment of a public energy company as the central facilitator of 
decarbonisation that will design, gear and upscale the energy transition in 
line with climate imperatives. Its main  functions should be to steer, design 
and implement the strategic trajectory of the Welsh energy transition; to 
enhance the swift generation of renewable energy serving as the entry point and 
one-stop-shop for all stakeholders; to effect demand management; and to take 
up an active regulatory role in an emergent Welsh supergrid.  To these purposes, 
it will need three distinct arms: a Funding Facility to foster renewable energy 
generation and energy efficiency measures; a Distribution System Operator for 
the Welsh supergrid; and a Research and Technology Centre.
  A more engaging approach is necessary in regards to the Zone Demarcation 
Scheme. People involvement, lay knowledge and consent is indispensable 
and calls for the granting of significant returns to the local community so that 
it can also accept the associated downfalls. This also allows ample room for local 
community utilities to step up and proliferate. 
2. Executive Summary 
Recalibrating climate targets and budgets
  The cascading effects of climate change and most recent scientific 
recommendations call for substantially upscaled climate action, targeting the 
1.5 degrees Celsius targets, carbon neutrality before 2050 and correspondingly 
tighter carbon budgets towards mid-century.
  There are strong economic, legal and political grounds for a bolder climate 
policy.
  Front-loaded climate action is most cost-efficient and increases possibilities 
for the successful mitigation of climate change. 
  An ambitious climate agenda strongly resonates with and is grounded upon the 
Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015. 
  Civil society pressure and the declaration of a climate emergency render a 
more risk-taking interventionist state an absolute necessity.
Designing energy policy for a fast-track energy transition
  The basis of a bold climate policy is a radical energy policy to implement a 
fast-track energy transition. This necessarily involves a dual and synchronous 
move away from fossil fuels (including the rapid phasing out of coal, the 
abandonment of shale ambitions, the reduction and circumscription of oil use 
to transport and the utilisation of gas as a true fuel-in-transition up to the 2040 
horizon) and towards clean and smart energy sources and systems (including 
proliferating bottom-up and decentralised forms of energy generation, 
community energy, as well as big scale renewable parks and moves towards a 
Welsh supergrid to match energy needs and interests).
  The energy transition may foster growth in some areas, but also tamper with 
growth in others. Sustainable welfare is a better match for strategies 
carrying out ambitious climate agendas; hence policy-makers could consider 
untangling from the growth imperative. 
  The energy transition can take a predominantly top-down and centralised, or 
bottom-up and decentralised form. While both dimensions are indispensable, 
the Well-being of Future Generations Act mandates strong citizen engagement 
in the co-production of energy and participation in energy decision-making, and 
hence conveys a strong bottom-up flavour to the energy transition. At the same 
time, climate performance will be more effective if it embraces the majority of 
the population in this grand endeavour. 
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4. Wales: background and state of the art 
Within this rapidly changing international context the UK Government has taken 
a number of initiatives that also bind Wales. The 2008 UK Climate Change Act 
set the goal of 80% emissions reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 levels and 
institutionalised fixed-term carbon budgets. The UK is also part of, and played a great 
role in engineering, the EU Climate and Energy Packages for 2020 and 2030 that 
mandate a 20% emissions reduction, 20% share of renewables in the energy mix and 
20% energy efficiency (20-20-20 goals) by 2020, and the updated 40-32-32.5 goals 
for 2030 (The 2030 goals may be reconsidered once and if the UK leaves the EU). 
The UK also participates in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) as a means to 
lower emissions and incentivise energy efficiency and renewable energy generation 
(again, the future position of the UK in this mechanism remains uncertain due to 
Brexit). The UK, moreover, has signed the 2015 Paris Agreement and has submitted 
its contribution plan to lower its emissions by 80% compared to 1990 levels by 2050. 
The Welsh Government’s 2010 Climate Change Strategy (PDF 2.70MB) was the first 
official document to place the climate challenge into the Welsh policy map, setting 
the overall climate direction and non-statutory climate targets for Wales. It mandated 
a 40% emissions reduction by 2020 against 1990 levels, as well as a 3% annual 
decrease in emissions in areas within devolved competence against the benchmark 
of the average emissions of the period 2006-2010. Building on this, the  Environment 
(Wales) Act 2016 paved the way for the setting of statutory emissions reductions 
targets and the design of carbon budgets. A year earlier, the innovative Well-being of 
Future Generations (Wales) Act (WFGA) institutionalised the obligation to embed 
sustainability concerns and ambitions in governmental policy. The goal for creating 
a low carbon society has been set in law with the first WFGA goal of a prosperous 
Wales. 
On the basis of the Environment Wales Act 2016, the Welsh Government put in 
place a roadmap to 2050 with the Climate Change (Wales) Regulations 2018. In 
particular, it committed to cut emissions by 27% by 2020, by 45% by 2030, by 67% by 
2040, and by at least 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. To this aim, the Welsh 
Government has designed its first carbon budgets mandating a 23% emissions 
reduction in the period 2016-2020, and a 33% reduction in the period 2021-2125. The 
Welsh Government is expected to design the next carbon budget for the period 2026-
2030 by the end of 2020. Wales’ more concrete climate goals include halving food 
waste by 2025 and generating 70% of its electricity from renewables by 2030, 
which it is on course to meet. The Welsh Government published in May 2019 its more 
detailed document regarding the implementation of its climate policy, Prosperity for 
3. Introduction - Climate science and the emissions gap
Climate change has been recognised as a global problem since the 1980s. The 
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) issued its first report in the late 
1980s warning that there is likelihood of anthropogenic climate change that will carry 
significant ramifications for humanity. Subsequently, and on the basis of mounting 
evidence, the IPCC expressed its certainty that anthropogenic climate change was 
indeed a fact. The initial threshold for climate change mitigation was put to levelling 
off the concentration of greenhouse gases (GhG) in the atmosphere to no more than 
450 parts per million (ppm), which would stem the average global temperature to 
maximum 2 degrees Celsius. 
In this context, the States signing the Paris Agreement in 2015 committed to work 
towards the achievement of this goal through the submission of their nationally 
determined contributions. Nevertheless, the sum of the pledges the states have 
submitted in the aftermath of the Paris climate summit bring the average global 
temperature increase to 3+ degrees Celsius, an unbearable level of climate change. 
Within this framework, the states of the Global North acquiesced to lower their 
emissions by at least 80% by 2050, a target far too slack in light of pressing climate 
imperatives. 
Synchronously with these international political developments, the cascading rise 
of greenhouse gas emissions has accelerated the impact on the climate. Hence, the 
IPCC in its most recent report in the autumn of 2018 recommends that global efforts 
are stepped up to target a global average temperature increase of no more than 1.5 
degrees Celsius. Despite such recommendations, States’ climate policies have not 
been updated to meet the 1.5 target, which practically mandates a goal of carbon 
neutrality (defined as the balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks) before 2050. For the Global North, other reports call for 
carbon neutrality to be achieved even earlier, and in any case no later than 2040. 
Within this global political framework and shrinking biophysical environment, states 
of the Global North are struggling with the challenge to address the sizable emissions 
gap. This calls for substantially upscaling their climate efforts, emboldening their 
climate ambitions, tightening their carbon budgets, and focusing on a swift energy 
transition of unprecedented scale away from fossil fuels and towards clean energy 
sources and systems to meet human needs. 
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PART I: NUANCING AND RE-SCALING THE 
CLIMATE CHALLENGE
5. The case for tight carbon budgets in line with the 1.5 target
5.1. Economic grounds 
Climate goals and carbon budgets have to be:
  responsive to climate science recommendations; and 
  proportional to climate needs, rather than to economic means. 
Very ambitious climate targets and much tighter carbon budgets hence are 
essential and call for front-loaded climate action. This is not only a moral issue, one 
of principle. It is also more prudent in economic terms, as it will avert an additional 
layer of costs associated with further climate change (see Box 1). To put it reversely, 
a bold climate policy can deliver far-fetched economic benefits in the form of 
avoided climate damage and lesser costs for adaptation.
In this context, economic goals, growth, employment etc. must not come ahead of 
and compromise decarbonisation and sustainability. As the Stern Review of 2006 
first disclosed, climate action to ensure sustainability is cheaper the earlier it 
takes place. To the contrary, the bill only goes up with the years. Climate inaction 
hence comes with a hefty price tag. Buck-passing the costs to the future generations 
obviously does not make the problem disappear. Indeed, this is part of the predicament 
we are currently facing. Had humanity taken profound climate action two decades 
earlier, climate change mitigation would have cost less and could have been carried 
out in longer temporal frameworks, and hence in a smoother way. Climate change 
mitigation is very expensive today, exactly due to the oblivion to act when we should 
have.
all: A low carbon Wales, with 100 policies and proposals for bringing emissions down 
and implementing current and future carbon budgets. 
Against this policy entrepreneurship, UK emissions have come down by 41% since 
1990. Welsh emissions, however, were only 14% lower in 2016 than in 1990. While 
they decreased in 2014 and 2015, they increased again in 2016 by 5%. In 2016, more 
specifically, emissions went up in the power, agricultural, buildings, and transport 
sectors, only slightly offset by reductions in industry. Since 2009, Welsh emissions 
have in fact gone up by 5%, in the main due to increases in emissions from the 
power sector (5% each year on average). 
In light of difficulties in bringing emissions down drastically, intensified climatic 
phenomena and the most recent assertions and warnings of the IPCC, the UK 
Committee on Climate Change has very recently (May 2019) recommended 
a significant upscaling of climate action and ambition to 100% carbon neutrality 
by 2050 for the UK. The bar has been set to 95% for Wales, due to Wales’ lack of 
land to accommodate storage facilities for the treatment of fossil fuels and 
its sizable agricultural activity. These recommendations are strong in both their 
coverage and implementation, as they include international aviation and shipping 
but exclude international offsets (as has been the case for Wales with the  Climate 
Change Wales Regulations 2018), and have been endorsed by the UK Government. 
The Welsh Government not only endorsed the updated goal, but committed to 
achieving the overall 100% UK goal, promising to put in law the amended target 
for 2050, bring forward concomitant regulation, and tailor the third budget and 
adjust the interim targets accordingly. 
Increasing evidence about both the impact and pace of climate change and the 
potential for mitigation have encouraged these policy shifts. While they remain 
substantially responsive in nature, rather than proactive, they bring home the 
understanding that the managerial and business as usual approach of the previous 
decades is far from fit for purpose and hence needs to be replaced by a visionary 
leadership style of policy-making to fast-track the energy transition. 
In this rapidly evolving policy context, this report aims to facilitate the 
implementation of fast-track decarbonisation in four distinct ways. First, it provides 
solid grounds for a Welsh climate policy that will be more ambitious than the 
official line, advising for carbon neutrality before 2050 to contribute to the 1.5. goal. 
Second, it situates climate policy more firmly within the public policy agenda. Third, 
it showcases global best practices that can facilitate the implementation of tight 
carbon budgets. Fourth, it sets out concrete energy policy pathways and sectoral 
decarbonisation roadmaps.  
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The argument that front-loaded action was and still is not needed, as with time 
new technologies will be developed on time to reverse climate change, besides 
being plainly speculative and deterministic, is counter-productive as it encourages 
inertia. Moreover, it runs contrary to the empirics of the energy industry. Oil is by far 
the most productive energy fuel, but humans have failed to find any equivalent to 
substitute it since the 1970s, thus clinging to its perpetual use (shale oil is much less 
efficient, as its production is extremely energy and water intense). While waiting 
for technological breakthroughs to save the day, however, more emissions are 
concentrated in the atmosphere; as a result, climate change mitigation costs rise 
exponentially. 
One should hence not examine the costs climate policy will inflict on the economy, 
and endeavour to strike a balance between ambition, achievability and cost. Rather, 
one should zoom in on the further costs climate change will effect on the economy. 
In other words, a dynamic rather than static cost-benefit analysis is needed. 
Against this background, the dominant policy dilemma between cost-efficiency 
and climate change action collapses. Skipping climate action-related costs 
will only make us poorer, not richer, as climate change continues generating 
rising costs. In this context, it is preferable to endure climate policy costs that 
will ensure sustainability, rather than suffer increasing costs by an overburdened 
climate without securing sustainability. To achieve the former, it is essential to set 
ambitious goals and implement tight carbon budgets in line with biophysical limits, 
rather than economic considerations. A steep downward trajectory for emissions is 
required, calling for front-loaded emissions reductions. 
5.2. Legal grounds 
Very ambitious climate targets and much tighter carbon budgets are also 
consonant with the key WFGA that places sustainability and the plight of the 
youngest at the centre, and mandates that all policies serve both traditional sectoral 
goals and interests as well as the principle of sustainability. 
In fact, when designing climate policy one should approach the issue through the 
eyes of today’s children and teenagers, who are both currently unrepresented and 
will bear the brunt of climate inaction. The UK-wide pupils’ strike in February 
2019, followed by the May 2019 Youth Strike 4 Climate, pays tribute to their plight 
and should act as a belated awakening springboard. A new mental condition, eco-
anxiety, is emerging, which refers to the anxiety and associated symptoms induced 
by fear of imminent environmental catastrophes that can ruin lives and push people 
to leave their lands and migrate, among others. It is through the empathy with the 
In energy terms, the transition implies a gradual appropriation of fossil energy for 
the establishment of renewable energy installations and clean energy grids, which 
will go hand in hand with standard fossil fuel use. In case this phase is not swift, but 
protracted, mathematical models show that it will be virtually impossible for fossil-
dependent countries, like the UK and Wales, to achieve both climate mitigation 
and energy security; either climate goals will overshoot, or energy shortages will 
emerge as a result of lower renewable capacity and climate-induced relinquished 
fossil use. In this understanding, the pace of transition and the time-frame targeted 
become the most essential variables. A sub-optimally rapid transition would lock 
countries in an inescapable energy-emissions trap. To the contrary, a rapid rollout 
of renewable energy and energy efficiency schemes makes much economic sense, 
as upfront costs are recovered through fuel savings.
Box 1. Climate change costs
  Climate change-induced extreme events, heatwaves and natural 
catastrophes hitting urban and rural spaces and demanding big chunks 
of the budget for restoration (Hurricane Sandy, for example, caused 
New York City $19 billion in damages; California’s wildfires cost only in 
November 2018 at least $9 billion).
  Less water availability and disrupted food systems can lead to diminishing 
crop yields,  less productive land use, food shortages and/ or higher food 
prices (Italy’s olives harvest, for example, has more than halved for 
climate-change related reasons).  
  Investment losses on soon-to-be-stranded fossil fuels assets and hence 
costs ensuing from the burst of the carbon bubble.
  More abrupt, and hence more expensive, policy changes needed in the 
near future.
  Loss of biodiversity, ecosystems resilience and aesthetic beauty, potentially 
impacting the Welsh tourist industry. 
  Costs emanating from heightened systemic risks – climate disruption 
leads to human life disruption leading to migratory pressures and conflict. 
  Costs associated with yet unknown further Earth system feedbacks, 
defined as further changes stimulated by ecosystems in response to initial 
changes geared by external forces, leading from small to runaway changes. 
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5.3. Political grounds
Civil society in the UK has a pronounced presence and role in endeavouring to gear 
the UK government towards much more effective climate policy (see Box 2). Policy-
makers hence are not in a situation where they have to take bold climate initiatives 
against the will of their constituencies; to the contrary, policy-makers only have to 
respond to growing popular frustration with contemporary, business as usual climate 
policy, implement long awaited radical climate measures and turn the tides around 
in the climate struggle. Indeed, civil society pressure has pushed the UK government 
and the devolved Welsh and Scottish governments to declare a climate emergency 
in April 2019, after which one would expect ground-breaking policies to be set to 
reverse climate change. While this has paradoxically not been the case, designing 
climate policy responding to an emergency rather than in a business as usual policy 
mode is critical at this juncture. In this context, the issue is not one of subsuming 
climate policy under broader economic, health, social policy priorities etc., but how 
radical, effective climate policy can also serve standard economic and social goals.  
Box 2. The role and push of UK civil society 
The rise of the global climate movement Extinction Rebellion, very active 
across the UK as a whole, exemplifies the struggle for a systemic change to 
avert climate change. The youth’s developing agitation over climate change 
also helps retain the issue on the agenda and acts as a persistent lever for 
pressure. Crucially, these movements round the global civil society’s agitation 
around climate change mitigation. Besides the long-standing activity of 
environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) and Friends of the Earth among others, pro-climate civil 
society movements have played a critical part in British politics opening up 
windows of opportunities and acting as policy entrepreneurs. The current 
juncture is akin, but even more critical due to even more pressing timetables, 
to the 2005 ‘Big Ask’ campaign the Friends of the Earth launched. Coupled 
by the ‘Stop Climate Chaos’ coalition in which more than 100 diverse NGOs 
participated, the campaign forced the UK government back then into 
voting in a Climate Change Act with statutory targets for annual emissions 
reductions. 
To institute such a broad, radical economic-ecological transformation, the Welsh 
Government should determine the direction of change carefully choosing mission-
oriented policies; invest on shaping and creating markets, rather than just fixing 
them and responding to market failures; and, immerse in risk-taking both to 
youngest generation and a rounded understanding of increasing eco-anxiety that 
policy-makers must approach climate policy. 
Fortunately enough, ambitious climate policy can deliver on across the board goals. 
In fact, the bundling concept, according to which climate policy must be seen as 
embedded in and congruent with all other policies and goals, is enshrined in the 
WFGA. In this context, climate policy can cater for and benefit not only the climate, 
but also other public policy issues, such as health, air quality, the economy, energy 
policy and security, social policy etc. This bundling approach consists in an integrated 
audit of: 
a) the co-benefits, both directly and indirectly monetisable, that accrue to other 
public policy issues from climate policy measures; and 
b) the savings that accrue from a reduction in the necessary investments to address 
other public policy issues. 
Bundling climate policy-related investments with other public policy issues is a more 
economic and cost-efficient way to tackle climate change, compared to business 
as usual siloed sectoral funds targeting sector-specific-only problems. The design of 
tight carbon budgets hence can be seen to follow the spirit and letter of the WFGA, 
as it can lead to: 
  integration of different policies and their costs and benefits;
  collaboration among stakeholders transcending sectoral boundaries 
  involvement of citizens and local communities to prevent worse-case scenarios 
and ensure positive results in the long-term; 
  Welsh prosperity and resilience; 
  improved health of its citizens; 
  the conditions for more equality, cohesive communities and vibrant culture; and 
  a globally responsible country freeing up more vital carbon space for the Global 
South. 
In the ninth section, the report elaborates on the bundling logic and associated 
benefits, and demonstrates how a far-fetched climate policy can be in the service of 
the WFGA goals. 
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Box 3. Political advice and climate goal-setting
It is usual for authoritative committees to remain conservative in their 
outlook in cases of fierce uncertainty and too many variables and unknown 
unknowns, as is the case with climate policy. Experts are usually pressed 
to downplay uncertainty, narrow down the richness of perspectives 
and provide regardless tailor-made policy recommendations that are 
workable for policy-makers. In this context, it is no surprise that more 
conservative pathways are chosen. Indeed, the IPCC’s predictions regarding 
the scale and scope of climate change have proved to be rather conservative. 
The UK Committee on Climate Change, moreover, itself states that it 
prefers to operate within safe and already considered feasible boundaries. 
Nevertheless, the UK Committee on Climate Change also asserts that 
more effective climate policy is possible today, in case the ‘mass roll-out of 
currently niche technologies leads to rapid cost reductions’, a tendency 
already in place, and because ‘the range of options could be wider and/or 
cheaper than we have assumed’. In this context, more ambitious targets may 
be equally feasible. Technocratic governance, however, is geared to cling to 
a system-perspective, with the system’s perpetuation and optimisation the 
main goal. This means that more often than not the problems are identified 
and defined in such a way as to match pre-given solutions, rather than to 
point to essential solutions that entail system disruption. 
More importantly, the setting of targets is fundamentally political, as it not 
only responds to, but also shapes, understandings as to what is feasible. 
Higher targets will mean greater mobilisation to mitigate climate change as 
opposed to lower ones. Moreover, while mediocre climate goals and carbon 
budgets are set, climate change disruption and consequences, as well as 
further learning and potential to deliver on the climate front, rumps up. The 
feedback loops between new evidence, updated policy design and policy 
implementation amount to precious wasted time and restrain climate 
action, and hence work to the detriment of climate policy. Pressing 
climate timetables thus render the classic method of evidence collection and 
certainty formation biased against effective climate policy and hence counter-
productive. In this context, it appears to be preferable to set ambitious 
policy that can not only benefit from continually developing experience and 
capacity, but also more vibrantly encourage climate mitigation potential, 
among others through more risk-taking by the state as argued above.
reap the rewards and to enhance learning, and future expertise and capacity. This 
amounts to a substantial switch from a regulatory, conservative in its posturing and 
managerial model, to the innovate, risk-taking, and more interventionist blueprint. 
The potential for such a transformative strategy is higher when the state does 
not rely on heavy command-and-control, top-down policies, but establishes and 
nurtures a decentralised structure in which organisations can develop, customise 
their operations, collaborate efficiently and adapt to changing circumstances. The 
proposal for the establishment of an energy company for Wales with different arms 
and diverse functions rhymes with such an understanding. Although it has been 
rejected by the Welsh Government for now, a strong case can be put forward that 
the state must put in place an umbrella company to steer the transition, accelerate 
its pace and mend the gaps a market-based approach entails. This proposal is fully 
set out in section 10.1. 
Indeed, contrary to widely held beliefs that innovation can only emanate from private 
initiative, the most defining breakthroughs of the last decades have sprung from 
public entrepreneurship, or public-private partnerships. The Internet developed out 
of the US state’s ARPANET scheme; the shale industry that boomed in the 2010s has 
been systematically supported by public money and schemes since the 1970s; and, it 
was the Chinese government’s resolve to respond to climate change and acquire the 
niche in a new technological frontier that led to an exponential curtailment of costs 
of solar power generation. China’s initiative not only outcompeted private companies 
around the world, but also fundamentally redefined the economics of the industry, 
as well as what is considered possible in both economic and climate terms.  
This point is critical for the design and implementation of far-reaching climate policy. 
The neo-liberal legacy into the 21st century means that most governments around 
the world still work on the assumption that markets will deliver; state intervention is 
appropriate only to correct market failures; and the ownership and benefits flowing 
from innovation can only be in private, rather than public hands. Not only do these 
theoretical assumptions fall short of the workings in the real world, but the state can 
effect much more rapid and effective change if it owns innovation and economic 
change; picks up technologies, the games to be played and partners from the private 
sphere; learns from its experiences; upgrades its management skills; and, becomes the 
pioneer in the all-encompassing field of climate policy, where markets have evidently 
failed to deliver. In fact, one reason that all formal advice remains circumscribed in 
its ambition compared to climate imperatives is that it works on the assumption that 
business must be responsive to policy, and so the policy can only go some way so 
as not to upset the market. Other reasons have to do with the workings, politics and 
political nature of expert advice (see Box 3).  
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fuels. Secondly, present growth under shallow decarbonisation does not prove that 
growth will remain unaffected by deep decarbonisation as well, as a certain trade-off 
is at play.
In fact, growth reduction as a result of deep decarbonisation is seen as a red line 
for policy-makers, and the most central barrier to drastic climate action. The growth 
discussion, hence, merits some further qualification. First of all, growth fails to ensure 
the rise in welfare anticipated on the background of past experience; growth rates 
nowadays yield more marginal positive reverberations on other welfare indexes, such 
as employment, wages, equality etc. for a plethora of reasons including competitive 
(labour) markets, technological advances, outdated business models etc. Secondly, 
growth may no more be feasible, especially for the Global North. In case we have 
entered a phase of secular stagnation, and low-growth becomes the new normal, 
an alternative economic and developmental blueprint is the only option available. 
At the same time, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Index for measuring growth 
has come under severe critique for economic oblivion, as well as for its stark 
failure to account for ecological and social parameters. Mainstream literature has 
thus moved to complement it with the notion of wealth, understood as stretching 
beyond productivity to encompass the management of a broad portfolio of assets, 
including produced, human, and natural capital. This, however, remains short of 
providing a full accounting index of countries’ wealth, not least as it still undermines 
the central role of natural capital, as well as the costs incurred by higher GDP indexes 
(which the GDP index absurdly measures as positive). Ecological economists, to 
the contrary, have long advised in favour of a threefold accounting system that 
comprises:
  a benefits account, similar to GDP;
  a costs account, incorporating costs incurred from economic activity, such as 
deforestation; and
  the remaining natural capital, in which carbon space holds a prominent place, 
indispensable for future economic activity. 
Such a combined wealth and costs accounting system would not only portray 
and reveal a different picture of countries’ wealth, but also give natural capital the 
prominent role it deserves; notify policy-makers of account imbalances; and, steer 
policy towards sustainable, rather than overshoot, welfare. In fact, the application of 
such accounting has shown that many Western states have failed to enjoy higher 
welfare levels the last decades, despite rising growth. This means that a switch in 
the focus from growth to sustainable welfare can undo the growth-induced 
losses, generate more social benefits of an unmonetisable nature (such as leisure 
PART II: RESHUFFLING WELSH CLIMATE 
POLICY
6. Undercutting themes of climate policy
6.1. Climate policy and growth 
While the WFGA positions sustainability at the core of policy-making focus, its 
interplay with the other public policy goals is not automatically clear. Far from that, 
the entrenched fixation with economic growth, the natural preoccupation with 
employment and the goal of higher welfare standards often lead to an either/ or 
debate. Sustainability in this context can suffer, its importance may be relegated, and 
the letter and spirit of the key WFGA may be left unobserved.  
Climate change is principally an energy problem, as the fossil fuels that run the 
economy are also the main culprit for climate change. Hence, since the very basis 
of our economy is unsustainable, a certain trade-off seems to be at play. Either a 
strong sustainability turn is taken and the economy may suffer some contraction, or 
the growth imperative retains a stronghold and determines the pace of sustainability-
targeting reforms. Indeed, this is the current state of play, increasingly at odds with 
climate science and pressing timetables for ecological-economic transformation. 
To be sure, the energy transition can also foster further growth (PDF 2.97MB). The 
case of the clean energy industry across the supply chain constitutes an indicative 
example. Moreover, novel sustainable economic structures and business models can 
emerge without necessarily downscaling growth. The switch to a circular macro-
economic model and to service- rather than commodity-based business models 
provide useful cues (see section 9.1.). 
Nevertheless, and besides reaping these ‘low hanging fruits’, the overhaul of the 
energy and economic system may have some repercussions on growth (PDF 
2.97MB), especially if renewables investments return lower electricity flows 
than anticipated. While the UK Committee on Climate Change boasts that the UK 
case proves that growth can go hand in hand with decarbonisation, two caveats 
need to be pointed out. First, growth is linked to lower emissions within the territory 
of the UK; the UK economy, nevertheless, bears a much higher carbon footprint 
if imports are added. In that case, UK emissions are 70% higher. This differential 
explains to a great extent the margin for UK growth. Growth, then, does not go hand 
in hand with decarbonisation, but is actually fed by the unsustainable use of fossil 
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climate policy must not just be designed with caution not to exacerbate inequalities, 
but also with an eye to promote equality. This translates into: 
  focused measures to support the least-well off in binary climate-social policy 
ways. Vulnerable households, including households facing energy poverty, 
and social housing need to be prioritised, as provided also in the updated EU 
directive on energy efficiency (PDF 2.73MB), irrespective of whether Britain 
leaves the EU, or not; 
  proportional support to the most affluent which will incentivise renewables 
uptake without increasing their relative wealth vis-à-vis the least well-off; and
  strengthened social corporate responsibility to share in the costs of the energy 
transition, rather than be subsidised through taxpayers’ money.
and quality time, more time for care etc.) and, more critically, yield a safe biophysical 
environment.
Climate policy, however, is obstinately weighed against the costs it entails measured 
in GDP units. Rather than emphasising both monetary and hard to monetise benefits, 
which remain measured in indexes regarded as inferior to the central GDP index, 
climate policy discourse remains mired in the distorting GDP-based discussion of 
its feasibility and desirability. The calculated 1-2% of UK GDP cost of climate policy 
hence remains a critical barrier to a more proactive climate agenda. This discursive 
dominance perpetuates a growth-GDP-centric fallacy and disorients from the 
essential task of retaining healthy, resilient ecosystems in which humans can thrive. 
In all, the pressing timetable for climate action; the rising costs that climate inaction 
entails; the progressively marginal benefits of, increasing barriers to, and pitfalls of 
growth; the downsides of the GDP-based accounting system; and, the central status 
of sustainability as enshrined in the WFGA, all mandate that Wales must forcefully 
consider prioritising a sustainable welfare, rather than growth, economy. Wales 
has a lot to gain from a systematic effort to experiment with ‘eco-localisation as 
a progressive response to climate change’ and move towards eco-restructuring 
and designing a ‘distinctive low-carbon polity’ (PDF 185KB).   
6.2. Climate policy and inequality 
Climate policy can both increase inequality, or serve as a platform and policy vehicle 
for lowering inequality. In the first case, climate policy is tied to economic incentives 
that the have-nots can usually not tap on.  For example, a scheme to connect 
energy efficient homes with lower council tax bills plays to climate goals, as it may 
well boost the market for energy efficient homes. The absurd outcome, though, 
is that these rebates will benefit the most affluent, and enlarge the gap with the 
have-nots, who cannot possibly benefit from such a scheme. For this reason, public 
policy in respect to climate goals has to be sensitive to inequality implications and 
reverberations. 
To the contrary, climate policy can be a springboard for more equality, if it starts 
from targeting the least-well off, while obliging the affluent to contribute their fair 
share in climate policy. This stems from the understanding that the carbon space is a 
collectively owned public good, of which the most affluent have more than their fair 
share. They should hence help offset (through their higher taxes) the least well-offs’ 
emissions and enable the gradual lowering of their carbon usage.
On this basis, and taking into account that equality is one of the goals of the WFGA, 
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Renewables parks are a perfect fit for feeding Welsh industries, the rest of the UK, or 
even regional export markets as a means to generate further revenues and bolster 
the Welsh budget.  
7.2. Energy markets, prosumers and decommodification
A further undercutting theme regards the role of the markets (including ownership 
structures and modes of transaction) in the energy transition. Contrary to traditional 
fuels that became widely commodified, renewables lend themselves to different 
business models, spanning across a continuum from commercial, profit-making 
models to exploitation for own use and for the purpose of covering one’s 
own needs, and reaching as far as decommodification. While in a centralised 
renewables market profitability remains key, decentralised energy systems can be 
organised both on a profitability and decommodified basis. In the first case, citizens, 
local communities and non-energy corporate actors become prosumers, potentially 
covering part of their own energy needs through self-consumption, and selling the 
rest to the central grid in order to generate profits and resume their sunk costs. In the 
second case, citizens, local communities and non-energy corporate actors use the 
energy they self-generate and share it in the grid for storage and flexibility purposes, 
rather than to generate profit. 
These models, the centralised and decentralised one, and the market or decommodified 
variants of the de-centralised energy model, have different implications for growth, 
prosperity and the state of equality. While a bottom-up decommodified model is 
about meeting energy needs, and hence fosters solidarity, social capital and more 
equality, a market-based bottom-up model may foster growth but leave inequalities 
intact, or even enlarge them. The same is the case with a centralised model of energy 
transition. 
These models are also expected to generate different climate outcomes, depending 
on how profound an energy transition they lead. In general, the centralised 
market-based energy transition model has failed to attract investments at a scale 
commensurate with the goals for renewable energy increase and for proportional 
substitution of fossil fuels. Incentives given to harness the bottom-up model, on the 
other hand, have been scarce and poor. As a result, they have failed to lure into the 
transition the critical mass of people, as regulation approaches people as investors 
and presupposes that they have both the means and the will to invest in clean energy. 
Innovative and generous funding and information schemes hence are required in 
order to bolster a bottom-up energy transition, render citizens the agents of transition, 
the drivers of emissions reductions, and prosumers of clean energy, irrespective of 
whether prosumption will be market-based or will go hand in hand with energy 
7. Energy transition pathways 
7.1. Centralised and decentralised energy architectures
The default way for implementing the energy transition has been to mimic the 
top-down policy model of market creation in the renewables sector. In this context, 
the emphasis has been upon incentivising big energy players to invest in extensive 
renewable energy generation facilities (such as wind and solar parks) in order to 
substitute fossil with clean energy. Despite the breakthrough of the 1999 devolution 
and the increase in devolved competences over time, Wales perpetuates this top-
down model of energy transition and a centralised energy architecture, which 
however makes less sense for renewable energy. 
In fact, the properties of renewable energy make local scales more appropriate for 
the production, transmission and consumption of energy. This reality fits in well with 
the WFGA’s principle of involvement and citizen engagement and participation 
in public policy implementation. These legal grounds provide a strong case for a 
decentralised, distributed energy model of transition for Wales. In this architecture, 
the role of citizens in co-shaping, participating in and boosting the energy transition 
is central. 
In 2017, locally owned renewable capacity was around one fifth of the total and 
amounted to 750MW. The Welsh Government’s target for 2030, set at 1GW, is 
evidently hardly ambitious. The Welsh Government’s provisions that from 2020 all 
new renewable capacity must have an element of local ownership, moreover, is 
rather vague and calls for further refinement. 
In general, emissions from the residential sector, the sector where citizen participation 
is easier to implement, can go down exponentially in case citizens are encouraged 
and actively supported to makeshift their homes into (near) zero-carbon through 
retro-fitting, renewable energy facilities, as well as demand-side measures within 
a smart grid. Benefits can spill-over to the critical transport sector through sector 
coupling with electro-mobility. Cars can function as batteries that store the energy 
smart houses produce overnight and hence fuel both residential and (part of the) 
transport needs. 
An increased emphasis on citizens and communities as co-producers of energy 
does not negate the centralised potential for renewable energy generation. To the 
contrary, Wales is well endowed to host bulky renewables facilities, such as wind and 
tidal parks. This, however, should not obscure the bottom-up potential of the energy 
transition, which will empower and benefit people and local communities directly. 
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8. What it all comes down to: a concise plan and 
decarbonisation pathways 
Adjusting climate action to the 1.5 degree Celsius increase goal, Wales must 
aspire to carbon neutrality before 2050, in line with the cascading effects 
of emissions concentration in the atmosphere. Urgent action to upscale the 
energy transition thus is required, setting forth the need for more ambitious 
goals, and proportionately tighter budgets. 
The roadmap presented below is more ambitious than the UK Committee on 
Climate Change’s for a number of reasons (see section 5.3.):
  The level of climate goals is critical for the scope of climate mobilisation 
and climate performance. More ambitious goals will spearhead more 
ambitious policy, which, in turn, will provide exactly what the business 
community anticipates: regulatory stability, long-term horizons and 
proportional support schemes. These will allow businesses and citizens to 
adjust/ upscale the level of investments in different fields/ activities (with 
energy efficiency and renewables standing out). Higher climate ambition is 
catalytic in providing solid signals for the future direction of the economy 
in the 21st century and has the potential to lead to a much more swift 
energy transition. 
  This report factors in technological developments and cost reductions 
as policy evolves, in dynamic rather than static terms in other words, that 
render a carbon-neutral economy possible in shorter time-frames. The 
implementation of global best practices, in the background of a more 
nuanced and balanced conceptual framework guiding economic priorities 
and targets, allows space for a faster, upscaled clean energy transition.    
  The upscaling of citizen engagement in the decarbonisation enterprise, as 
mandated by the WFGA, can enlarge the scope and proliferate the pace of 
the energy transition. 
  The imminent energy-emissions trap (see section 5.1.) makes shorter 
time-frames more appropriate for climate change mitigation and energy 
security purposes.
In this mindset, a fast-track downscaling of Wales’ carbon footprint necessarily 
implies that: 
decommodification.   
In all, Wales can choose between:
  a more progressive climate agenda and a more limited climate policy to the 
extent that it does not undermine growth; 
  a largely top-down or bottom-up model of energy transition; 
  a market based or decommodified variant of a bottom-up energy transition;  
and
  utilising climate policy as a vehicle for more equality, or not. 
On the grounds of the WFGA:
  Wales needs to target sustainable welfare in line with pressing climate 
imperatives. This means that it needs to disentangle its climate policy from the 
growth imperative and put in place tight carbon budgets that may compromise 
it. Extra caution should be given that economic losses do not translate into 
welfare losses. Distributive and compensatory mechanisms may be necessary to 
achieve this, in particular regarding job creation. 
  The energy transition must have a clear bottom-up component, premised upon 
citizen engagement and participation in both energy production and decision-
making. This still leaves ample room for centralised clean energy production 
schemes.
  The variant of the bottom-up energy transition model remains up for grabs and 
can be decided upon with reference to the country’s overall strategic vision and 
the place of market relations within it. 
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concomitant resolve not to build further gas plants that will only lock-in 
gas use for decades against climate imperatives. Bulky renewable capacity 
is well within the remit of countries undergoing an energy transition, 
as is manifest by the frequent negative electricity prices, caused by 
higher than predicted renewable energy generation, central Europe 
faces. Crucially, carbon capture and storage (CCS) should be discouraged 
due to its clash with other land uses and high energy intensity, high 
economic costs implicated and broader health and environmental risks. Its 
premature stage of development, moreover, far from guarantees successful 
roll-out, nor provides the indispensable attached environmental and safety 
safeguards. In terms of energy potential, then, Wales must heavily invest 
on clean energy sources. As the recent Report of the Institute of Welsh 
Affairs Re-energising Wales project showcases, full decarbonisation no 
later than 2035 is feasible. 
  Transport – Transport emissions derive largely from long commutes. 
Hence, the emphasis on active travel and behavioural change will not 
amount to much, unless it is supplemented by the granting of new options 
to commuters/ travellers. The only viable way forward is a comprehensive 
plan for transport that will include the South Wales Metro; the overhaul 
of infrastructure to accommodate multiple charging points in functional 
proximity to one another; and the tying in of residential renewable energy 
generation facilities with plug-in electric cars. This transport system should 
be deployed within the 2020s, and be fully (nation-wide) operational by 
the 2030s. At this point, there will no end use for oil. 
  Industry – The Economic Action Plan and the Economic Contract should 
provide a much more powerful sticks and carrots framework to discourage 
unsustainable practices  and nudge sustainable ones. The broad adoption 
of a circular corporate economic model (see section 9.1.) and the addition 
of renewable energy supply, demand management and energy efficiency 
as indispensable pillars of business models should be the goal for the 
Welsh Government within the 2020s. The possibility, rather than assumed 
certainty, that this may lead to carbon leakage should not serve as an 
impediment to a holistic restructuring of the Welsh economy. 
  Buildings – The residential sector is central in emissions reductions in 
three ways. First, residential emissions can drop substantially by initiatives 
to enforce higher energy efficiency standards (both regarding insulation as 
well as in-home appliances). Secondly, buildings can yield energy demand 
  a moratorium on coal must be put in place. The Aberthaw coal-fired 
power plant, in particular, in regards to which governmental ambiguity 
persists, needs to be shut down by 2020 contributing imminently to the 
emissions reduction goal. A ‘coal exit Commission’ can be established to 
institutionally lock-in this process;
  there is no place for unconventional energy, including shale oil and gas; 
  oil should be phased out well before the 2040s;
  natural gas (not including shale/ unconventional gas) should become the 
actual fuel-in-transition roughly for the next two decades; 
  nuclear energy supply can continue in line with existing plants’ lifetimes. 
New nuclear projects, however, stumble against too high costs to ensure 
health and safety; 
  no new fossil-fuelled plants should come onstream, as they will either lock-
in fossil consumption in the long term, or constitute disastrous economic 
decisions since they will have to come offstream before sunk costs can 
be resumed. The Aberthaw plant is a good case in point. Responsible 
for 37% of Welsh power emissions and 12% of total Welsh emissions 
in 2016, its climate footprint mandates its premature closure despite 
significant economic costs. In the same context, the goal of bringing 
onstream new gas generation capacity over 350MW is either devoid of 
long-term economic logic or dissonant with climate goals.
The above refer to ending the catastrophic climate legacy of the fossil era, 
but do not shed light on the whereabouts of a sustainable economy. Indeed, 
what is urgently needed is a strategic energy plan that will delineate how 
much renewable energy needs to be generated to make up for the entire 
fossil consumption, which has to be regulated out well before 2050 in line 
with climate imperatives. In what follows, a brief sectoral-based roadmap is 
presented for drastic emissions reductions in Wales. 
  Power – Wales must decide in the very short term what energy pathway it 
prefers to follow. It must strengthen grid capacity accordingly, and provide 
immense motives for the generation of centralised and decentralised 
renewable energy in the balance it wishes. Wales should design a detailed 
plan of how much renewable energy it will need to produce for every 
carbon budget. These calculations have to be formed on the basis of 
an abrupt (quicker than currently scheduled) coal phase-out and the 
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9. Reaping co-benefits across the public policy nexus: best 
practices and evidence from around the world
The bundling approach introduced in section 5.2. allows policy-makers to focus on 
the co-benefits climate policy can produce across the board, thus strengthening the 
case for a more proactive and extensive climate policy across sectors. In particular, a 
forceful climate policy can produce substantial economic, health and social policy, 
and energy security co-benefits. It is critical to point out that these are both missed in 
the absence of a proactive climate policy, as well as that the costs and risks implicated 
in current economic, health, social and energy security policies remain high despite 
the space for much cost-efficiency through climate measures. Secondly, a more 
proactive and extensive climate policy can also set in motion the much needed 
transformation of the economy and facilitate the design of novel business models 
that are a better fit for an economy under biophysical stress.
9.1. Economic co-benefits 
Fossil energy imports devour a substantial chunk of foreign exchange. An ambitious 
climate policy aims directly at the curtailment of fossil imports to effect drastic 
emissions reductions and, hence, leads to substantial foreign exchange savings. In 
contrast to fossil imports that constitute outflow of money and a significant burden 
for trade and payments balances, renewable energy, as a substitute to fossil imports, 
can be generated at home. Energy efficiency is also a local business. This carries a 
number of important economic advantages, including: 
  more local economic activity across the clean energy supply chain;
  higher employment and boosting of wages;
  a concomitant skills acquisition; 
  the re-spending of (most of) the locally generated money will further empower 
the local economy multiplying aggregate demand and overall disposable 
income;
  the potential for the creation of a new export industry (perhaps specialising in 
specific areas across the supply chain); and
  higher taxes paid back to the public cashiers, which can further finance public 
policy.
Germany’s Energiewende reflects these priorities both in design and as outcomes. 
China’s pronounced turn to a more ambitious climate policy the last decade also 
chimes with its intent to become a global leader in solar technology. At the current 
critical juncture when the economy is under profound transformation, states that 
reduction or add to grid capacity by means of residential renewable 
energy generation facilities, as well as by feeding with electricity, and thus 
neutralising, the transport sector. Thirdly, corporate sourcing of substantial 
amounts of renewable energy is essential. Institutions such as universities 
and hospitals can play a pivotal role in setting examples and evidencing 
best practices, adding to grid capacity and reducing overall energy 
demand and thus emissions. The overhaul of the buildings sector should 
be completed by the early or mid-2030s.
  Waste management – There are two priorities here. Reducing landfill is 
tantamount to emissions reductions. On top of that, waste can generate 
renewable energy, thus indirectly contributing further to emissions 
reductions. Significant opportunities exist here for industries, not least 
through clustering. The sector can be carbon positive in the near future, no 
later than the early 2030s. 
  Agriculture and land use – The adoption of waste-to-energy technologies 
and a circular economic model in agriculture are the two central ways 
to reduce emissions. As many of the emissions produced in agriculture 
are natural, this is the only sector where some emissions are acceptable; 
these are expected to be offset by the workings of carbon sinks, primarily 
through intensive afforestation. 
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Moreover, current business models have been designed for a previous era, in which 
natural capital was undervalued. Factoring in the increased value of resources 
and lower emissions can recalibrate these business models in a more sustainable 
trajectory. For example, IT retail companies could shift to a leasing business model 
(PDF 2.97MB), where they lease personal computers and laptops for certain periods, 
but retain their ownership so that when customers wish to switch, or IT equipment is 
underperforming, IT companies can fix/ maintain them and eventually either recycle 
them or responsibly treat the waste. This serves the needs of the people, allows 
even higher profits for the companies, and collectively brings down the number 
of materials needed (and the energy they require for their assembly/ function 
etc.). Moreover, it leads to more responsible waste treatment compared to the 
appalling extant situation whereby electronic waste (e-waste) is dumped on sites of 
the Global South in the least responsible and hence ecologically most burdening way. 
However, companies do not have much incentive to change a profitable business 
model in the absence of concomitant regulation. An eco-tax reform or low-carbon 
credits would nudge them to do so. 
An even more indicative example comes from the energy sector. Utilities’ core 
business model lies in purchasing energy and selling it back to consumers at a profit. 
Rather than remaining (in most cases dirty) energy traders, utilities and retail energy 
companies could turn into auditors of their customers’ energy performance. In 
this role, they can detect the opportunities for energy savings, finance the substitution 
of the least energy efficient appliances with efficient ones and charge higher prices 
per unit of energy. Sacramento (PDF 2.97MB) has successfully implemented such a 
policy decades ago. This is a win-win case, as
  Consumers would see no difference to their bills (or benefit from lower bills 
depending on the utility’s strategy), as they would be charged a higher price per 
unit of energy but would overall consume fewer units;
  Utilities would maintain or even increase their profits, not least as they would 
require fewer energy purchases and hence suffer less exposure to global energy 
markets; and 
  As a result, emissions would decrease considerably, without any economic losses 
for neither the energy incumbents, nor the consumers. 
In all, substantial economic co-benefits arise from an ambitious climate policy, as 
long as the focus is upon: 
become pioneers in the emergent clean energy industry tend to benefit the most, 
while latecomers will entertain fewer benefits.  
Secondly, and within a limited carbon budget, national economies have incentives to 
remain competitive by downscaling their carbon footprint. Climate change thus 
mandates a circular economic model, which can sustain more material wealth, in 
stark contrast to the contemporary throwaway economic model that undervalues 
resources and generates plenty waste. In a circular economic model, resources are 
properly valued as inputs, used in the economy, and then returned either to the 
economy as raw materials (through reuse or recycle), or as nutrients to the biosphere. 
This model is directly applicable to fuelling agriculture, industry and district heating, 
by turning waste into energy.
This circular macro-economic model must feed in the microeconomy, enabling and 
nudging business models that are a closer fit for a world of limited carbon space. 
The means to effect such course of change of corporate behaviour is tax cuts/ credits 
for low-carbon companies. This should be enough for big and liquid corporate actors 
to become less carbon-intensive; for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), zero-
interest loans would be necessary alongside tax cuts to enable them to adopt a 
greener energy portfolio. This way corporate actors could focus besides their core 
business into minimising carbon use and maximising gains from lower carbon 
consumption, in line with an increasingly limited carbon space. 
In a UK context, efforts have focused on commercialising CCS technology. The 
partnership between UK universities and the iron and steel industry with the 
goal to render the latter carbon neutral by 2040 is a case in point. Nevertheless, it is 
important to underline the strong caveats that persist in regards to these moves, since 
technologies remain immature and associated economic, environmental and health 
risks paramount. CCS also means that fossil fuel use remains rampant, cancelling out 
the many economic benefits fossil divestment entails for the economy, as set out 
above. 
Corporate investments on clean energy parks to fuel industrial activity, on the other 
hand, are more risk-free and hence a safer bet and investment. A number of institutions, 
such as universities and hospitals, are well-placed to follow such a strategy with an 
eye to contribute to climate change mitigation, and reap both associated economic 
benefits and improved public profile gains. The University of Exeter’s clean energy 
plan constitutes a prime example in this direction.
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to make ends meet. People living in energy poverty are also eligible for a number 
of social benefits, which burden the public budget. Combating energy poverty at 
source (PDF 1.82MB) by financing energy efficiency and renewable energy facilities 
would be much more economical in the long term, liberating the state from a number 
of benefits to be paid. To the extent that energy poverty is a structural factor that 
hinders employability, its combat would also improve the employment prospects of 
the least well-off. This would additionally impact favourably upon the labour market 
and the wider economy’s competitiveness. Furthermore, and to the extent that 
poor economic conditions are associated with anti-social, delinquent and criminal 
behaviour, such climate-social policy measures could also release more resources off 
the starved police forces.    
In all, climate policy can:
  contribute to a healthier Wales in the most cost-efficient way; and
  minimise social costs through targeted measures to combat energy poverty.
9.3. Energy security co-benefits  
Energy security, understood as supply security at affordable prices within a strict 
carbon budget, is central to states’ welfare. This is because, first, threats to energy 
security could paralyse the state thus inviting foreign interventions and, secondly, 
energy crises create formidable economic conditions, hampering welfare. 
Energy security then is about the resilience of an economy to meet its energy 
needs and not suffer any economic setbacks in light of energy shortages. In this 
context, the more direct, national and local sourcing of energy seems a quicker 
route to energy security compared to the volatile global oil and globalising 
Eurasian regional gas market from which Wales sources most of its gas. This is so 
because:
  Exposure to these markets’ boom-and-bust cycles retains a high risk of 
skyrocketing oil and gas prices once every few years;
  Dependence on unreliable exporters reduces energy and economic resilience; 
and 
  Importing states, including the UK, utilise storage capacity and a large transport 
and transmission infrastructure to mitigate such effects, which however adds to 
  nurturing the potential of the clean energy industry;
  switching from the throwaway to a circular economy; and
  encouraging different business models via tax instruments and zero-interest 
rates.
9.2. Health and social co-benefits 
NHS Wales is under formidable and unprecedented stress. The standard approach 
has been to endeavour to finance NHS Wales more generously, and in so doing 
starve local councils and state budgets, in line with people’s justified requests. An 
alternative approach is to aim at combating not the symptoms, but the very 
sources of poor health. It is at this point that climate and health policy conjoin. 
Growing emissions deteriorate the state of air quality, leading to poorer human health, 
being responsible for an increased number of cardiovascular episodes and cancer. 
A climate policy that would drastically limit emissions and proportionately 
improve air quality would have a far-fetched positive impact on human health 
and public finance. Further economic co-benefits also arise, as improved health also 
translates into fewer working days lost to diseases and higher productivity. 
Canada’s Ontario has taken such an approach viewing poor air quality as a health 
issue to be tackled by means of climate policy. This approach had profound results. 
Ontario endorsed a massive program of renewable energy generation and energy 
efficiency, which allowed it to largely displace fossil energy-induced emissions. 
Besides achieving bold climate goals, Ontario also saved on health-related expenses, 
as well as contributed to its citizens’ health and the economy’s productivity (PDF 
1.82MB). Health and climate policy can be designed synergistically, providing a win-
win case for policy-makers. 
Climate-related health risks, moreover, are only aggravated the more climate change 
remains inadequately mitigated. In the US, for example, mosquito ‘disease danger 
days’ have proliferated, putting Americans in higher, more prolonged risk and 
inducing further costs to the US health system. This makes a joined up, pre-emptive 
climate and health policy imperative. 
Climate policy can also provide critical social benefits to the extent that it can battle 
energy (fuel) poverty. Energy poverty constitutes a hard to overstate burden on the 
least well-off and society by and large. This is because energy expenses take up a 
disproportionate share of poor households’ budget, making it very hard for them 
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10. Recalibrating proposals on the table
Drawing both from the above discussion, as well as from long-standing debates 
within the Welsh policy-making contours and public sphere, this section critically 
discusses one climate policy proposal on the table and one ongoing energy and 
climate scheme. It recalibrates them so that they can both enable the design and 
serve the implementation of tighter carbon budgets. 
10.1. An energy company for Wales 
Energy transitions are supply and market-driven. They hence respond to policy and 
regulatory incentives and market signals to create profitability margins in line with 
lowering emissions. As a result, some crucial aspects of the energy transition, such 
as energy demand and consumption reduction, energy efficiency and savings, and 
demand management remain substantially downplayed. The role for a public energy 
company is to promote such aspects, gear the transition into the much needed 
demand-side direction and design a holistic plan for the substitution of the old fossil 
energy infrastructure with a clean and smart energy system in line with climate 
imperatives. 
The proposal for an energy company for Wales in particular has attracted sizeable 
attention, and lent itself to democratic, discursive processes. What Wales does not 
need is an energy company focusing on supply, entering the market, playing the 
role of and competing with established market players, burdening the public purse 
with implicated costs and jeopardising taxpayers’ money. What Wales needs is an 
umbrella company that focuses on energy demand management and consumption 
reduction, energy efficiency and savings, and investments on clean energy sources 
and systems to upscale and fast-track the energy transition. 
To do so, the new energy company needs to focus on four concrete areas in order 
to fill the gaps and cracks within the extant energy landscape and address market 
failures. More specifically, it should: 
  supervise energy auditing or itself audit consumers’ energy performance and put 
in place energy efficiency measures;
  promote demand management that is emphatically lacking from energy 
transition plans; 
  take up an active regulatory role in an emergent Welsh supergrid; 
overall energy costs and final retail prices. 
To the contrary, energy security is much better served through renewable fuels 
and clean-based energy sources. More specifically:  
  Local, national and regional renewable energy systems are more reliable in the 
sense that they do not depend on distant, complex and often invisible market 
forces, geopolitical interests and concomitant manipulation; 
  States can invest on clean energy in line with their energy endowments and 
needs, set up their own clean electricity systems, strategically decide on their 
interlinkages and interdependencies, and reshape their energy systems in a 
more transparent, manageable and predictable way;
  Demand-side policies have a pivotal role in this enterprise, as they will decrease 
demand for energy, prioritise energy efficiency, and thus bring overall energy 
demand down, thus supressing both associated investment costs and exposure 
to traditional fossil and renewable energy risks; 
  Dependence on imports of clean energy materials is far less cumbersome and 
problematic in that they are of an one-off nature, as opposed to the need for 
ubiquitous flows of oil and gas; and 
  Dependence on electricity flows within regional systems, moreover, is less of an 
issue, as imports of electricity are less prone to disruption compared to gas due 
to the properties of electricity. 
It should be stressed that this analysis does not hold for decarbonisation that passes 
through CCS. In that case, risks and costs remain as is the case today, since energy 
supply is still premised upon mostly imported fossil fuels, although their emissions 
become stored. This provides a further argument, from an energy security standpoint, 
as to the preferential pathways to decarbonisation and sustainability. 
In the case that a smart grid is established, finally, it should be stressed that this 
represents a serious cyber-security risk. Smart grids will hence demand a further 
layer of expenses to hedge against such risks. These expenses have to be factored in 
the decision to opt for a smart grid, or for alternative energy configurations, such as 
stand-alone, off-grid and mini-grid systems. 
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the net capacity to substitute fossil energy in the next two to three decades 
must be calculated and a proportionate plan put in place for the generation 
of renewable energy. Individual prosumers, community energy stakeholders and 
corporations should consult with the public energy company that will be able, fifthly, 
to give the go ahead for renewable energy generation plans. Wales can also plan in 
the near future for generating extra capacity for export purposes. This strategic plan 
can be understood as building upon the Bridgend Energy Catapult that uses the 
Energy Path Network Tool, but expanding beyond heat to a multi-vector approach, 
operating at the national level, and providing for the much needed energy systems 
approach for the whole of Wales. 
To achieve these goals, the new energy company will need three distinct arms:
  a funding facility, akin to Scotland’s Climate Challenge Fund, co-financing 
energy schemes and providing zero-interest loans to foster renewable energy 
generation and energy efficiency measures;
  a Distribution System Operator for the Welsh supergrid, that will take up smart 
meters’ roll-out, and coordinate Welsh renewable energy production and 
consumption, as well as supplies to the rest of the UK through network linkages; 
and
  a research and technology centre that will focus on promoting fit-for-purpose 
innovation, with an emphasis on storage and electro-mobility solutions in 
the Welsh context. These are critical to enhance the smooth functioning of a 
100% clean energy-fuelled grid, and to bring emissions down drastically from 
the transport sector. Open channels of cooperation with the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) will be invaluable in tapping on associated 
expertise and streamlining innovative projects in the Welsh context.    
10.2. A more engaging approach to the Zone Demarcation Scheme
The Welsh renewable energy policy has been premised since the mid-2000s 
upon the Zone Demarcation Scheme. This planning scheme was designed 
in the hope to streamline procedures for investors to invest heavily in the 
renewables sector. Nevertheless, the concerns and interests of affected 
communities were ignored/ heavily disregarded, together with the 
projects’ adverse environmental and social repercussions. Reasonably, 
  steer, design and implement the strategic trajectory of the Welsh energy 
transition; and
  enhance the swift generation of renewable energy serving as the entry point 
and one-stop-shop for all stakeholders.  
In line with the successful blueprint of Sacramento outlined above, the new energy 
company must promote reduction of energy consumption. The first step would 
be to allow energy companies a short period in which they can delve into auditing 
their customers’ energy performance and accordingly finance the substitution of 
their appliances. The public campaign should also render crystal clear that it is to 
customers’ interest to have their company audit their energy performance, and hence 
nudge companies to do so in fear for losing customers that will switch to other energy 
companies applying the auditing scheme. In these cases in which energy companies 
fail to act, the new energy company should intervene and enforce this plan. Energy 
companies stand to lose in this case, since they will see their customer base shrink 
and profits go down. The positive side-effect of this scheme is the demand that will 
be created for the most energy efficient appliances, which will lead to a short boom 
in associated sectors and yield profits across the supply chain.   
Secondly, the roll-out of smart meters and smart grids takes place at a UK-wide level, 
but at dishearteningly slow paces. This lies in stark contrast to other states, like Italy 
for example, where the roll-out is virtually complete. The new energy company can 
take up an active role in the smart meters’ roll-out as a necessary tool in demand side 
management, by operating, for example, fines to energy companies not complying 
with established deadlines. At the same time, it should educate consumers of the 
virtues of the new system, familiarise them with the opportunities, options and novel 
tariffs available, and incentivise their active take-up and use to harness substantial 
energy savings. Information campaigns and seminars should take place as soon as 
possible, so that consumers are in position to take stock of the smartening of energy 
systems. 
At the same time, thirdly, the new energy company should take up an active regulatory 
stand in order to foster the finetuning of local production and consumption, and 
prepare plans for a Welsh clean energy supergrid that will cover the whole of Welsh 
needs in the medium term. This also expands to the establishment and governance 
of local energy hubs, the fostering of storage solutions to provide flexibility and 
resilience to the Welsh supergrid, and sector coupling with electro-mobility.
The above call for the fourth competence of the new energy company, the design 
of a strategic plan for the scale of renewable energy generation in Wales in 
the next two to three decades. On the basis of reduced energy consumption, 
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11. Brexit’s adverse impact  
The yet unknown terms and timetable for Brexit add a further layer of contingencies 
and raise a number of further concerns in regards to Welsh climate policy. First of all, 
the turn from fossil to renewable energy is, for both technical and economic reasons, 
consonant with the regionalisation of energy relations. In this context, supergrids 
can unite different regions; this, however, calls for hardware (infrastructure) and 
software (regulation) that allows for and fosters interconnectivity. The oscillation from 
a hard Brexit to remaining within the EU Economic Area (EEA) allows no certainty as 
to the UK’s part in such a future enterprise. For now, uncertainty will only delay such 
investments. Once things take on a more certain shape, the kind of relations the 
UK will retain with the EU will impact decisions on joint energy infrastructure with 
continental Europe.
Part, and an early sign, of the future pan-European electricity configurations is the 
North Sea Offshore Grid Initiative, a joint scheme between the UK, Germany, France, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg to harness 
offshore wind energy and other renewable sources in the North Sea and channel 
clean energy across northern Europe. Whether the UK remains part of this project, 
which will be run in accordance with European rules and standards, remains open to 
question amidst the Brexit uncertainty. In case a hard approach is taken and the UK 
uses different rules and standards, it will be unable to reap the benefits of the inflows 
of thus generated clean energy (let alone at favourable prices). The consequences are 
not circumscribed to losses of clean energy; they are also very important in terms of 
flexibility afforded by the participation in supergrids, and hence in terms of energy 
security and resilience.     
Similarly, the UK benefits exponentially from its place within gas networks (including 
interconnections with continental Europe) that provide the country with liquidity 
and hence low gas prices. In case Brexit leads to trade barriers, the UK is set to 
suffer from increasing gas prices. This might then lead to different outcomes: 
affordability losses, the spurring of clean energy investments, or, to the contrary, the 
encouragement of shale oil and gas exploration or even higher coal use. 
The impact Brexit will come to bear on the labour market and the level of skills 
required for the energy transition remains a huge question mark, especially for the 
first post-Brexit years. In the case of a hard Brexit, the UK will have to source skills 
across the clean energy supply chain (research, installation, maintenance etc.) largely 
outside the EU, a daunting task in a short time-frame. Such a lack of skills may act 
as a further barrier to the fast-track roll-out and proliferation of renewable energy 
facilities. 
these schemes met with local resistance with the effect that renewable 
generation has been stalled, and hence been overall meagre compared to 
initial hopes. 
This highlights that a more engaging approach is necessary. As enshrined in 
the WFGA, people should be involved, their opinion asked for and listened to 
and their judgements as lay people seriously taken into account. At the same 
time, it is irrational to expect local communities to adhere to business plans 
that entail certain downsides (such as aesthetic and biodiversity losses), but 
do not produce direct economic and social benefits for them. Novel corporate 
strategies and business plans are thus necessary, in which local communities 
become active stakeholders. Communities’ engagement can take various 
forms, such as communities becoming co-investors, or recipients of a sizable 
rate of returns and/ or guarantees for local employment, local reinvestments 
etc. To the extent that such strings attached undermine corporate profitability 
and undercut investors’ eagerness to invest, local communities could step up 
and themselves become energy generators. In fact, municipal utilities have 
mushroomed across Germany and central-northern Europe the last fifteen 
years, providing both successful blueprints and associated know-how and best 
practices. 
The role of an energy company for Wales in actively assisting local communities 
to become energy generators is critical and expands across all stages: planning, 
financing, implementation, assessment and maintenance. With the help and 
expertise of a Welsh energy company, it is likely that both private investments, 
public-private partnerships and community energy schemes can mushroom, 
transforming Wales into a green hub.   
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12. Conclusions and recommendations  
To sum up, climate policy should be commensurate with climate science diktats and 
climate change imperatives. This is cost-effective, in the sense that Welsh welfare 
hinges upon the indispensable maintenance of a healthy biophysical environment. It 
is also cost-efficient, as climate inaction comes with a hefty price tag, while climate 
action avoids severe climate damage and offers invaluable co-benefits in various 
other public policy sectors.
Contrary to other states lacking cornerstone legislation for future generations and 
cross-cutting policy mandates, the WFGA in an essential way streamlines Wales’ future 
pathways. The equal weight of sustainability with other goals necessitates Wales to 
reflect upon its entrenched growth strategy, target sustainable welfare instead and 
move in the direction of a distinctive low-carbon polity. 
The WFGA also mandates a bottom-up energy transition pathway that can have 
significant reverberations on the equality front. This can be joined up by large-scale 
renewables projects that can fuel industries and exports in a top-down way. An 
energy company for Wales can have a pivotal role in steering and fast-tracking the 
energy transition and become a hub for all energy stakeholders. The more the Brexit 
conundrum does not translate into hard and soft barriers with continental Europe, 
the more the energy transition will be facilitated. 
